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Abstract
In his paper, Michael Merry poses an interesting and important question: How can we navigate between
two often opposing interests—that of protecting the welfare of our society’s children and that of protecting their liberties by avoiding paternalism? While Merry lays out his argument with clarity and insight
into the risks and harm that state paternalism incurs, his discussion of such risks and his suggestions for
possible resolutions are all bound within a paternalistic framework. Taking on a maternalistic, or more
specifically, a caring, perspective may allow us to understand the issue more fully—that is, as part of the
larger problem of oppression, and to offer alternative solutions that enable a society to care for the health
and well-being of its children while avoiding the harms that paternalism imposes.
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W

hen we look at Aldous Huxley’s Brave
New World (1932/2006), we see that the vast
majority of people who live in this world
(i.e., not the “savages” who live outside of it) do not suffer from
poverty, disease, hunger, violent crime, fear, or even from unfulfilled desires. The leaders of this world seem to exercise an extreme
form of paternalism, particularly as it is defined and discussed in
Michael Merry’s paper, “Paternalism, Obesity, and Tolerable Levels
of Risk” (2011). The Directors in Huxley’s novel believe that citizens
cannot be trusted to make decisions that serve their best interests;
thus the Directors must make the rules for them. When I teach this
book to my students, they feel sure they wouldn’t want to live in
Huxley’s world, but they have a hard time defending the right of
individual liberty over the good of having an entire people live
without suffering. “Maybe the Directors’ way is the best way to live,”
they say with frowns and a bad feeling in their guts.

readers have a problem with paternalism. Parents, and more
specifically fathers in their traditional role, have acted paternalistically for ages without thinking such behavior morally suspect. Also,
many, even those in pluralistic democratic societies, do not seem to
have a problem with government acting paternalistically, at least in
some situations. For example, when governments set age limits on
such activities as smoking tobacco products, drinking alcohol,
having sex, driving, voting, getting tattooed, buying pornographic
material, and getting married, many can see the merit in such laws
even though they do limit parents’ rights to make decision for their
children. Many in society also see the merits in requiring all
children of a certain age to attend school, live free from abuse and
neglect, and not participate in pornography. These are laws
designed to prevent children suffering from all of the serious and
potentially fatal harms that such activities can incur. The laws are in
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While Huxley’s brave new world shows the horror of living in an
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place and are fairly well accepted presumably because many don’t
fully trust that all parents will protect and safeguard their children
from these harms. Merry argues, rightly, that though these laws are
intended to protect the needs and well-being of society’s children,
they are nevertheless paternalistic in that they basically say: We
cannot trust that you (i.e., the parents) will make the best decisions
for your children, so we must step in and make these decisions for
you.
In his article, Merry illustrates the difficulty in balancing the
benefits of paternalistic laws (i.e., they can protect the welfare of
children) with the harms they can impose (i.e., they can and often do
limit individual liberty). His analysis of the problem of paternalism,
particularly in the case of laws aimed at protecting children from the
health risks of obesity, is important and astute. His suggestions for
resolving the conflict between safeguarding society’s children and
avoiding the harm of paternalism, however, lie solely within a
paternalistic framework. Perhaps what is needed is to step outside of
paternalism and approach this issue from an alternative viewpoint.
The question of how we as a society can best deal with the risks of
obesity while avoiding the harms of paternalism is, therefore,
examined from a maternalistic framework in the last section of this
article. The aim in this last section is to offer a fresh perspective on
the issues Merry raises and present new insights and possible
solutions that will further Merry’s analysis and inquiry.
Merry’s concern over paternalism from the government is
that it limits individual liberty. He suggests, “paternalism entails
interference with the liberty of another for the purposes of
promoting some good or preventing some harm” (p. 2). Certainly
such rules and laws as named above interfere with a person’s liberty
in a certain sense. That is, parents are not free to allow or force their
children to work on the family farm rather than attend school; they
are not at liberty to make money by putting their children in a
pornographic film; they cannot send their children to purchase
alcohol or cigarettes for them. The government has, in Merry’s
words, “interfered” with the parents’ decision-making power by
making certain decisions for them, and most people agree with
government intrusion in these areas.
But what of obesity? Obesity is an interesting case for a couple
reasons. One, as Merry points out, it is currently the top concern of
the World Health Organization. Two, addressing the concerns of
obesity is, at least in some ways, more complex than addressing
problems of underage smoking or drinking. Unlike cigarettes and
alcohol, areas identified as significant health risks to children for
which governments impose paternalistic rules and regulations,
children cannot simply not eat, whereas they can completely go
without cigarettes and alcohol. Banning tobacco and liquor to
minors is fairly straightforward. And while prohibiting food is
straightforward, it is an absurd answer to obesity. Yet banning
unhealthy food, or unhealthy eating habits, is anything but
clear-cut. How can we be sure that what is healthy for Johnny is
healthy for Susie, or what is healthy for Maria when she is relatively
sedentary is healthy for her once she starts gymnastics?
While there are healthy ways to lose weight, there are also
many unhealthy fad diets being advertised and promoted in the
media. How can parents and children know which ones to avoid
democracy & education, vol 20, n-o 1

and which to follow? While asking one’s doctor for advice is often
preferable to following the latest diet craze, doctors cannot always
be relied upon as infallible experts. As Merry states, “attempts to
prevent harm also entail risk, and those with medical degrees are
not immune from criticism” (p. 4). Doctors have been known to
employ what we now believe to be morally reprehensible “treatments,” such as eugenic sterilization, defining homosexuality as a
psychological illness, and “the banning of children with disabilities
from school” (p. 4). Relying on experts or the state to determine
how and what a child eats does not guarantee that the best interests
of the child are being met. Further, as Merry explains, it requires far
more intimate and complex intrusions than simply banning a
particular product (i.e., banning unhealthy food is far more
complex and intrusive a matter than is banning tobacco and
alcohol). Thus, Merry’s question about how we can best avoid
paternalism in public policy while still addressing the very serious
problem of childhood obesity is a provocative and important one
because it raises difficult questions about how to best balance the
protection and promotion of healthy and safe children with the
liberty of individual choice and family intimacy.
Paternalistic acts are often well-intentioned. However, they
do, as Merry rightly argues, run the risk of infantilizing and
diminishing the individual liberty of those whose well-being is in
question. Merry says that the “moral aim of paternalism is to act on
behalf of the interests of others who presumably lack sufficient
information or the resolve to inform and guide their actions” (p. 2).
This brings to mind Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story “The
Yellow Wallpaper,” in which the husband of the main character acts
paternalistically when he insists that his wife rest and not strain
herself by writing (1899/1997). As a doctor, he feels he knows better
than does his wife what is best for her, and he overrides her own
belief that she will improve if she is given time to write. Her liberty
to choose for herself what is in her best interest is taken away by her
husband who does what he truly feels is best for her, though we as
readers know he is harming his wife. This is an interesting example
because it shows how wrongheaded and, indeed, harmful paternalism can be even when the intent is to be kind and beneficial. It
would be easy to imagine this same physician/husband dictating
his wife’s or child’s diet in order to avoid obesity; after all, he is the
husband, the man, the father, and a doctor. Who better to decide
for his family members what will best promote their health and
well-being?
The problems arise, Merry points out, when we consider that
paternalism may incur more risks than would the risks of the
targeted behavior: “risks to privacy, risks to family intimacy, risks
to free choices over an individual’s own leisure time, etc.” (p. 4). He
thinks that determining “how to balance the liberty interests of
ordinary citizens against what many feel is a public health concern
is very complex” (p. 2). In cases of obesity which “are not morally
different from many other cases involving health risk” (p. 4), Merry
posits, we must attempt to “balance state paternalism against the
special privileges and relationships parents have with and toward
their own children” (p. 3). Additionally, Merry argues that we must
look at the risks state paternalism poses in validating and thereby
strengthening the stigma attached to obese children. Labeling
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obese children as being at risk “often carries moralizing baggage
that contributes to the perceived risk” (p. 3). Children labeled in
schools as at risk for any reason are too often “recipients of condescending treatment and lowered expectations” (p. 3), and those
who statistically are most at risk of obesity are poor or belong to
certain minority groups. Thus, labeling obese children as at risk,
Merry says, may lead to “targeting the poor generally and specific
ethnic minorities in particular” (p. TK).
Merry rightly argues that we should pay very close attention to
all of the risks associated with state paternalism. While we as a
society may agree that state intervention in promoting the health
and welfare of children in some cases or with particular health risks
may be beneficial, Merry urges us to always examine the risks
associated with acting paternalistically. I would like it to go without
saying that all risks ought to be examined when taking any course
of action, particularly those that interfere or disrupt the liberty of
others; however, it does not go without saying. Too many
people—and we must worry most about those in positions of
power and authority over many others—approach decisions with a
one-sided view and do not look at all of the risks associated with
their decisions. Thus, Merry poses a very important question:
When is paternalism appropriate and when does it carry with it too
many risks? Put another way, when does paternalism risk more
than the actions it is trying to avert?

Universal Approaches to Addressing Childhood
Obesity that Avoid Paternalism
When the risks of acting paternalistically outweigh those incurred
by the targeted concern, we may need to look at alternative ways of
addressing that concern. Merry suggests several alternatives to
state paternalism in addressing the growing problem of child
obesity. He asks that we consider putting warning labels on
unhealthy and addictive foods, providing subsidies for nutritious
and healthy food, taxing junk food, holding advertisers accountable for promoting unhealthy eating, and providing sound nutritional information to students and parents so they may make more
informed choices. According to Merry, these are policies and
practices that can be applied to the general public that address the
risks of childhood obesity without incurring the risks associated
with state paternalism.
While I agree that Merry’s alternatives do a lot to limit
interference with parents and children as well as the intimacy of the
family, they seem to interfere with the liberty of corporations and
advertising agencies. To varying degrees, all rules, laws, regulations, and expectations imposed on people, groups, organizations,
or firms interfere with the liberty of those for whom they are
targeted. Given that the laws, regulations, and so on are designed to
promote the health and well-being of people, they are all paternalistic in some sense, according to Merry’s definition. So, the questions
then become: When do we impose rules, upon whom should the
rules be imposed, and what sort of rules should they be? Is it more
acceptable to interfere with the freedom of corporations than that
of individuals? As small-business owners, my husband and I must
follow more and more state and federally mandated rules and
regulations every year, and it’s to the point where it is nearly
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impossible, without having to pay the exorbitant price of a full-time
lawyer, to even know or keep up with all the new rules. Such
interference in the liberty of businesses and corporations is indeed
an interference in my family’s ability to earn a living. Thus, limiting
the liberty of corporations indirectly limits the freedoms of individual people. The state steps in and, in effect, says to business owners
and corporate CEOs that it cannot trust us to look after the welfare
of our employees so the government must impose rules.
When we operate within a paternalistic framework, as Merry’s
article does, trying to find universal rules and regulations that look
out for the health and well-being of citizens, we run into some very
tricky questions about whose liberty we should protect in any given
situation, the extent to which we should regulate people’s and
organizations’ behaviors, and how we should balance the rights of
people to live in freedom with the rights of people to live healthy
and protected lives. Merry’s article, being limited to a paternalistic
view, may not offer a broad enough perspective from which we can
address these questions. The problem, as Merry argues, is not just
obesity but paternalistic solutions to obesity. The answer to Merry’s
concerns, then, may not lie within the standpoint of paternalism.
Perhaps if we adopt an alternative framework, one that cannot
impose the dangers of paternalism, we may shed some new light on
how we can approach the problem of childhood obesity as well as
other health risks children face, and this may enable us to further
the important inquiry and analysis Merry begins.

Maternalism as an Alternative Framework
To understand how a maternalistic framework may be useful here,
it is helpful to look at maternalism as it contrasts with paternalism.
When we are being paternal, we are taking charge, making decisions for others, and having the attitude that our decisions are
better than those for whom we are caring because they are not intelligent, informed, caring, or worldly enough to make the best
decisions for themselves. Maternalism connotes a more nurturing
approach to addressing a concern or problem. Traditionally, fathers
were seen as decision makers for the family, mothers as caretakers.
Traditional fathers’ roles called for fathers to help their children by
making decisions for them, while mothers helped by trying to get
their children to feel happy, safe, comforted, and loved. Paternal is
more authoritative while maternal is more supportive. Of the two,
then, paternalism is more limiting to the child’s liberty than is
maternalism; it says to the child: I know what is in your best
interests better than do you, and therefore you should give over
your decision making (at least in certain areas) to me. Maternalism
says to the child: If we work at this together, we can come up with a
solution that meets all of our needs.
It is this attitude of “I need to step in because I know better
than you what is best for you” that bothers many of us about
governmental paternalism, because the government does not
always know what is best for individuals or organizations,
regardless of how well-intentioned the state may be. Just as the
husband does not know what is best for his wife in “The Yellow
Wallpaper,” having the best intentions and even some expertise
does not mean that one will make the best decisions for others.
Yet individuals and corporations also do not always know what is
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in their own or others’ best interests, nor can they always be
trusted to act in ways that serve the interests of themselves or
others. So what is the answer?
Some answers may come from approaching this problem in a
more maternalistic framework. Susan Dodds (2000) claims that
the risks of paternalism in the medical community continue to be
addressed with the altered “image of the doctor-patient relationship from the presumed beneficent paternalism of the doctor,
acting on the best (medical) interests of the compliant patient, to a
contract between patient-consumer and doctor-service provider”
(p. 213). The doctor’s role is no longer one of imposing her will on
the patients who submissively comply. Rather, the doctor-patient
relationship is one of mutual respect where the doctor is recognized as an expert in medical affairs and thus qualified to give
advice, make suggestions, and offer a plan of action, and the patient
must use the advice and information to make his own choices
about what is best for him.
Simply having the doctor offer advice, information, and
suggestions, however, does not necessarily avoid paternalism. As
McLeod and Sherwin (2000) argue, medical information oftentimes is complex and difficult to explain clearly and simply: “Even
the most independent and self-reliant patient often feels overwhelmed and is inclined to defer to medical authority when facing
serious health matters” (p. 267). Thus, a suggestion from a doctor
may have the effect of a directive rather than merely one among
several viable options from which the patient may choose. McLeod
and Sherwin raise very interesting issues regarding liberty and
oppression. One cannot simply escape the risks of paternalistic
interference by calling on people in positions of authority and
power to make suggestions rather than demands or rules. While
the length of this paper does not allow for a discussion about how
oppression makes the issue of paternalism far more complex than
is shown in Merry’s paper, it is worth looking into how caring, as
defined and explained by Nel Noddings (2002), may provide some
valuable insights into addressing the issue of paternalistic interference even for people who are oppressed in a society.
Noddings’s ethic of care is a relational ethic; it requires that
there is a caregiver and a carereceiver. This relational notion has
powerful implications for our purposes here. If we approach the
issue of childhood obesity with care, we must, by definition,
recognize the fundamental and dynamic role of the carereceiver as
part of the solution. One does not help a child in a caring manner if
one does not first truly listen to the needs, feelings, experiences, and
goals of the child. A caregiver does not impose her will on a child.
Rather, a caregiver offers advice and information based on her
ongoing and developing understanding of the child, not just on her
own expertise, goals, and beliefs. According to Noddings (2002),
paternalism need not be a concern if we treat the child with care or
“attentive love [that] listens, it is moved, it responds, and it monitors
its own action in light of the response of the cared for” (pp. 136–137).
Doctor or parents, then, would not simply tell an obese child what to
eat; they would instead take the time to identify the needs and
feelings of the child and then offer the sort of help the child requires
(and because each child will have different needs and experiences,
each child will require a unique plan of treatment).
democracy & education, vol 20, n-o 1

If the state mandates certain diets or treatment plans for obese
children, such paternalism certainly runs the high risk of interfering with the liberties of the child and the parents, as Merry points
out. If we keep caring in mind, the state could require that pediatricians take childhood obesity seriously as a health concern. It could
also offer informational workshops on healthy eating and nutrition. It is then up to the parent, as well as the physicians, to use the
information provided by state agencies and other sources to help
the child only after establishing and maintaining a caring relation
with the child.
The ethic of care recognizes that humans are social beings,
interdependent upon one another. Thus, caring does not seek
liberty through complete independence and self-sufficiency.
Rather, according to Virginia Held (1993), caring seeks to promote
“relations of empathy and mutual intersubjectivity” (p. 60).
Addressing concerns of obesity with children in a caring manner,
then, avoids paternalism because it includes the children in a
genuine and loving way in determining what the best approaches
are to helping them. The children’s liberties are not threatened
because from a feminist, caring framework, liberty is not defined as
complete separation and independence from the parent. Childen’s
liberties are enhanced and nurtured when they are loved, cared for,
listened to, and understood, and they respond to the care not only
by participating in the decisions about what is best for them but
also by caring for themselves and adopting the practices and
actions necessary to address their problems of obesity.
Merry raises very important concerns about paternalism
when governments step in to try and protect the health and welfare
of children. His entire discussion, though, operates within a
paternalistic framework. Although he offers some interesting and,
I think, worthy solutions, we may get even further by looking at
this issue from a more feminist framework. The ethic of care offers
promising insights into this issue, insights that may lead us even
further in our understandings of the risks of paternalism and the
possible ways we may avoid it while looking out for the welfare of
our children.
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